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INTRODUCTION
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i
initially, wind energy state-of-the-art advance-
merits involved the quantity and quality of the
power produced by small wind energy conversion
syst_,s (SWECS). As wind energy commercializa-
tion increases, however, SWECS manufacturers
must rapidly adopt rigid reliability programs.
Wind machines must not only meet design perform-
ance specifications, but they must also perform
without costly component or structural failures
to assure continued market growth.
This paper is intended to identify potential
SW[C-_eslgn problems and thereby improve
product quality and reliability. Mass produced
compQnent_ _ as gearboxes, generators,
bearings, etc., are generally reliable due to
their widespread uniform use in other industries.
The likelihood of failure increases, though, in
the interfacing of these components and in SWECS
components designed for • _pecific system use.
Problems relating to the structural integrity of
such components are discussed and analyzed in
th_s report with techniques currently used in
quality assurance programs in other manufacturing
industries.
SUMMARY OF FAILURES
One of the prime objectives at the Rocky
Flats Small Wind Systems Test Center (WSTC) is
to determine the operational characteristics of
a SWECS over a range of wind speeds up to at
least 85 miles per hour (mph). At some point in
the testing, most SWECS experience at least one
-- wind storm with 85 to 120 mph winds, and the
sbVere loading on SWECS components has been
sufficient to cause failures. In some cases,
the entire SWECS is lost due to a critical
component failure. At least 40% of the SWECS
tested have experienced one or more fatigue-
related failures and of all the failures experi-
enced, at least 65% were obvious fatigue (see
Table 1). The failures attributed to fatigue
have been substantiated by the Rocky Flats Plant
Metallurgical Group. Since most of these failures
were caused by high short-term stresses, some
SWECS that survived conceivably contain parts with
fatigue-related damage which has degraded the
materials to the point where failure is imminent
even though not apparent.
Even though the Rocky Flats wind environment is
severe, the accumulative damage from lower wind
speeds has also been sufficient to generate a
fatigue caused failure. For example, an aluminum
hub on one SWECS failed during a storm with a peak
velocity of 28.6 m/s (64 mph). The SWECS had pre-
viously sustained higher wind speed loadings which
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apparently initiated or accelerated crack growth.
From the investigations of the failures the
following causes have been identified:
1. Loadings higher than expected;
2. Vibrational loading excited within opera-
tional range;
3. Thin material was unsupported;
4. Sharp edges and threads caused stress risers;
5. Poor quality assurance on fabrication,
welding, handling;
6. Voids or Cracks in cast parts (no x-rays
made by manufacturer).
DISCUSSION OF FATIGUE FAILURES
High Loadings
The wind energy industry includes the "garage"
inventors as well as high technology research
companies. Load analysis of SWECS designs range
from trial-and-error methods to detailed computer
programs. Regardless of the degree of design
sophistication, the designer must use common
sense and a spatial visualization of conditions
that may be detrimental to the survival of a
SWECS.
Testing has uncovered such basic problems as skin
material of insufficient thickness to sustain high
wind loading (Figure 1). Cyclical loading of the
Figure 1 - Blade Skin, Fatigue Failure due to
High Loading and no Support Structure.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19820015821 2020-03-21T16:58:26+00:00Z
TABLEI - SUMMARYOFWSTCFAILURES
SWECSNAME
Dunlite 81/02550
Grumman W/S 25
Zephyr 15
Electro WVSOG
Altos 8B
American Wind Turbine AWT-16
Pinson C2E
/(Tl-l_ille10-3 IND
Parris-Dunn Free-Lite
UTRC {I/3 scale)
Dakota SI-4
Whi rlwind A240
Enertech 2 kW HR-1
North Wlnd 2 kW HR-I
Windworks 8 kW Proto
ASI/Pinson 2 kW HR
DATE FAILURE (PARTS & NATURE) AND REFERENCE
12/04/78 Blade buckling, fatigue, and ductile fracture; tall boom
and hardware fatigue; high wind - 94 mph; RFP-3028/
3533/79-12.
None at WSTC; bolt failure and subsequent hub loss in
Wyoming (modified by manufacturer).
Weld cracking from high vibration; blade fallure (tied)
during high winds; RFP-3041/3533/79-13.
Yaw shaft - coarse fatigue - multlple_racks in weld
heat affected zone; RFP-3004/3533/79/7-1.
03/25/79 Hub--porosity. sharp edges, hoop stresses led to rapid
fatigue during gusts to 64 mph; had experienced higher;
RFP-3035/3533/79-10.
i2/04/78 ....Rotor (tied) bent In half (12/4/78),breakup (i2/5/79);
12/05/78 tall - failure still being investl_ated
12/04/78 Hub plates fatigue cracks from vlbtation; blade skins
(3) fatigue cracks from vibration.
12/04/78 Blade skins - buckling and fatigue; Weld - cracking
from severe cut-in torque; Coupling - fracture from
12/05/78 severe cut-in torque. Blade skins -buckllng, fatigue
and rivet pull through; RFP-2992/3533/79-3.
12/05/79 Hub nut - unscrewed; Rotor shaft ke_ay - fracture on
side; hub collar fracture; 119 mph wind storm.
09/20/79 Caught upwind, tried to cut-ln, and fractured
coupling.
12/05/79 Eye bolt weld - fracture - report not released; Blade -
fractured on contact with tail boom; tail boom weld -
fracture from blade strikes.
04/06/80 Came off tower - cause unknown; B|_de c fracture from
high rpm and vibration .........
12/21/79 Lightnin_ rod - fatigue from high vibration.
11/79 Rotor shaft - bent, load unknown.
03/80 _ Blade - ground contact fractured tip (metal to fiber-
glass); hub collars - fatigue in corner to porosity;
"bolts - cracks in threads - fatigue to failure.
Report in preparation.
03/80 Cracks in welds - noted prior to testing.
08/14/78
01/28/78
12/04/78
blade in this example created fatigue cracking and
eventual failure. This created high vibration
loadings in other components and contributed to
their fallure as well (Figures 2 and 3).
SWECS which have induction generators must
accurately control the rotor rpm and the electri-
cal connection to the grid. The reverse torque
from a cut-in at too high a rotor rpm can lead tp
severe damage to couplings (Figure 4). Secondary
damage can be suffered by the rotor and nacelle
support structure.
The fact that a SWECS is undergoing mainten-
ance does not eliminate the possibility of
damage. A rotor shaft was accidentally bent
during a manual manipulation of the rotor system.
The bend was discovered when machine operation
revealed high rotor vibrations. The associated
frequencies were close to other component fre-
quencies and their excitation was also noted. An
unbalanced rotor can have the same effect and
lead to fatigue failures in several components.
The shaft, in this instance, was loaded to the
design stress or beyond.
VIBRATION
SWECS vibration is often generated during
operation of the rotor. The wind loads on the
\
Figure 2 - Tail boom, Attachment fatigue due to
high stress and vibration.
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Figure 3 ' Tail boom, Fatigue emanating fr_
attachment holes.
Figure 4 - Coupling, Failure from high torque
cutln.
rotor occur wlth somewhat random frequencies.
The frequency durations are short and system
damping usually prevents excitation from creating
nlgh loadings. The critical points are when
SWECS operatlonal frequencies (i.e., rotor rpm)
coincide with the fundamental frequencies of
the system components. The rotor blades, In
partlcuIar, are critical because their excitation
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is transmitted throughout the system and may
cause other component excitation.
The rotor vibrations of interest are: I per
revolution (1P), 2P, and 3P; Ist, 2nd, 3rd
fundamental flapwise; Ist torsional; and Ist
chordwise blade frequencies. The 1P, 2P and 3P
are directly related to operational rpm and
are excited by rotor imbalance or aerodynamic
loading (i.e., tower shadow) generic to some
SWECS configurations. The critical point is
where the operational frequency coincides with a
blade fundamental frequency.
A typical high vibrational loading failure is
shown In Figures 5 and 6. The SWECS underwent a
high energy 3P rotor excitation at a frequency
where the SWECS and tower interacted (4.B Hz).
The vibrational motion was termed "violent" and
led to rapid fatigue growth of cracks in the
blade skins and welds at the rotor shaft and
support plate Joint. In thls case, the skin
design should have eliminated the stress risers
(sharp corners) and firmly attached the skin
around the_o_nt to the support arms. However,
movement in the skin under operational loadings
caused fatlgue cracking (Figure 5), and weld
cracking (shown In Figure 6) was Initiated by
severe motions of the rotor and tower. The welds
were found to be of good quality, pointing out
the need for proper SWECS and tower matching.
Modal analysis was conducted after the failure
and after installation of a new unit on a dif-
ferent tower. The tests confirmed that first
tower and SWECS interacted, l"ney also predicted
the new configuration would pass through the
rotor 3P excitation, wlth greatly reduced energy
at a frequency of 2.5 Hz of the tower. A new IP
excitation was felt to be a possibility (corres-
ponding to rotor imbalance) but has not been seen
to date.
|
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Figure 5 - Overall view of cracks in the skin of
a blade. The numbers indicate the
cracks.
Figure6 m Overall view of one of the cracks in
a plate on the rotor shaft.
Figure 7 shows a 2-mlnute vislcorder trace of a
SWECS rotor system with a fundamental ,st bending
frequency of approximately 7 Hz. During the
modal analysis, it was discovered that two sharp
frequency peaks existed, one at 6.6 Hz and the
other at 7.2 Hz. Figure 7 shows there is a
notable increase in amplitude of the bending and
torsion between the corresponding rpm's noted on
the trace. An rpm of 396 represents 6.6 Hz and
420 rpm represents 7 Hz. Modal analysis of the
loadings that generated this trace confirmed
that the fundamental bending and torsional
frequencies were present.
for component compliance with predictions, which
is sometimes beyond the manufacturer's capability.
One possible design change is to modify the blade
fundamental frequencies, in this case upward, as
420 rpm is near maximum for the machine. Another
change might be to alter the rpm control and not
allow the critical rpm to be reached. Both of
these changes would have to be checked for
interference frequencies with other components
prior to implementation.
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Several changes could be made to the system to
rectify this problem, but the problem should have
been originally noticed in a Fan Diagram and
designed out as an undesirable operating point.
A typical Fan Diagram is shown In Figure 8. It
should be noted that if the diagram is generated
by theoretical analysis, it must be substantiated
Figure 7 - Vlsicorder trace of bending and
torsional vibration excitation on
North Wind Prototype # 1 blade.
Figure 8 - Typical fan diagram.
Thin Material Loading And Attachment
When SWECS have metal blades, it is common to use
a thin skin covering to create the airfoil shape.
The substructure could include ribs, stringers
and spars. The combination of these parts must
be lightweight, yet strong enough to carry the
loads. Part interfacing and placement are the
areas In which problems normally arise.
The first case in point involved a SWECS that
experienced a windstorm while in a maintenance
orientation. The blades (which consisted of a
main spar, ribs and skin) experienced buckling of
the skln between the ribs. The buckling created
highly stressed areas which fatigued rapidly.
Figure g shows the buckled areas and the resulting
fatigue cracking. It should be noted that the
cracking also propagated along the leading edge,
which was due to a tight-bend radius creating
residual stresses in a material which was not
sufficiently ductile. The leading edge crack was
secondary, but design changes were still required
to correct the problem. The blade skin between
the ribs was unsupported and when bending was
sufficient on the compression side of thls
airfoil, the skin buckled. Thls is commonly
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known as "oti canning." The redesign included
the addition of stringers between the ribs that
attach to and support the skin, changing the
leading edge radius and adding a leading edge
spar. A material change was also made which
helped to reduce the residual stresses and
microcracks that are present intight radius
bends in brittle materials. These changes
__ Increased the survival rating by approximately
|
30%.
The blade failure in Figure 1 was of a simllar
type, except the rotor was operating and the
wind exceeded the survival ratlng. Since the
manufacturer has a different blade for high wind
speed sites, no redesign was made.
Holes represent a stress concentration factor of
approximately 3. A mu_h higher factor is possible
if: 1) the hole is not deburred; 2) Improper
edge distances are used; or 3) the hole has sharp
corners (i.e., a square hole). Figure 5 shows
cracks beginning at sharp corners. Burrs
in the holes can cause premature failure of the
fastener as well as the surrounding metal.
Scratches and notches have the same effect and
precautions should be taken to avoid them.
/o!
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Figure 9 - View of Blade skin buckling and
cracking in unsupported area. Note
leading edge cracks and skin peeling.
z - _ Another blade skin problem which potentially
leads to fatigue (Figure 10) is the attachment of
skin sections to the ribs, where the thin skin is
a Ioad-carrylng component. Riveting alone is
often insi_fficient to transfer the loads. The
•movement between the skin and ribs tends to
elongate the holes until rivet pullthrough
occurs, which increases the stress at the
remalnin3 rivets. This movement also causes
galling ahd_fat_gue Cracking. Using skln doublers
in this area (possibly with a bonding substance)
i _ will c)amp the-Skins to the rib, and load can be
i --_ transferred by friction between the layers as
| well as the rv_s. _are must be taken in
| _ _ _el=ectlng similar materials which do not create
B_ _ gaTvanlc action, and in making joints aerodynamic
so that blade performance is not reduced.
Stress Risers
Stress risers are not totally avoidable. However,
a few simple considerations should be reviewed to
avoid spontaneous loadings and failures.
Figure 10 - An example of how skin movement
caused rivet pullthrough. (arrow)
Bolts contain stress risers in the threaded ar_a
and when used in high stress areas or bending it
is imperative that no threads are in the bend
area. Bolts should also be of good quality, even
if rolled threads are required.
It is also important to consider the environment
and materials being used. Corrosion from salt
water spray or galvanic action may create stress
risers that lead to rapid failure. Anodized
coatings and the use of bonding compounds can
help avoid problems.
When parts are machined, it is important to cut
proper radii and break all sharp edges. The
intersection of two holes should be checked for
stress risers and such intersections should be
avoided as much as possible.
If the part is Cast, x-raYs should be taken to
assure that no voids exist. Figure 11 shows an
example of a cast part which contained voids.
The machined hole penetrated the voids, and a
fatigue crack developed which led to the failure.
It is possible that the void alone may have been
sufficient to cause the failure.
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The heat affected zone surrounding a weld can be
an area containing mtcrocracks and residual
stresses sufficient to cause fatigue cracking
and eventual failure. Figure 12 shows a frac-
tured weld in a highly stressed area of a SWECS
yaw column• This failure led to the loss of the
machine, which fell from the tower. Such welded
areas should be designed away from the high
stress areas or should be heat-treated to reduce
residual stresses. Proper welding practices must
be followed, and the services of a certified
welder should be obtained whenever possible.
Proper removal of slag and even the grinding of a
small portion of the weld surface can help
prevent fatigue cracking. Where multiple weld
passes are necessary, the weld area may have to
be "back ground" to insure integrity. Making
sure of sufficient weld material and a reasonable
"factor of safety" will also help prevent unwanted
failure. X-rays of welds are prudent.
shows a similar deformity problem and also a
crease which is the type of damage that initiates
and accelerates fatigue cracking.
....... =i
Figure 11 - View of hub which fatigued from
area of casting voids.
Quality Assurance
The manufacturer has a basic responsibility to
assure the SWECS i_ manufactured, handled and
delivered to the dealer without undue degradation
to the life of the components or system. The use
of x-rays to check for casting voids and cracking
in a welded area was discussed in the previous
sections. Material handling is important from
the initial fabrication to the final installation
of the SWECS. Materials must be kept free from
damage or alterations of the planned design.
Fabrication discrepencies located in a highly
stressed area could lead to premature failure and
costly replacement. Figure 13 shows three
variations of the forming of a blade trailing
edge. If the deformities had been more pro-
nounced, they conceivably could have affected
rotor dynamics and caused vibration which
could have led to fatigue failure. Figure 14
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Figure 12 - View of yaw column fatigue
in weld.
Figure 13 - Variations in manufacturing the
trailing edge can lead to aero-
dynamic instability,
Shipping the SWECS to a buyer's site can be
costly if the packaging is insufficient to
protect the components. Figure 15 shows a crate
which was destroyed during shipping, resulting
!n b!adeskl, damage (arrow) which required re-
placement at the manufacturer's expense. Figure
13 shows how the blades were subsequently shipped
in a box with plywood sides and foam dividers
between the blades and the sides. While this
method of shipping is more costly, it will
probably be cheaper than replacing damaged parts.
Figure 14 ° View of blade manufacturing damage.
(arrow)
CONCLUSIONS
Prevention of fatigue failures is within the
capability of even the most financially restrict-
ed companies. The reliability and safety of a
system depend on doing the best designing,
manufacturing, and installing possible. Where
long-range survivability predictions are needed,
component and system testing becomes necessary.
While manufacturers do conduct tests, limited
funds and equipment usually restrict such
tests. Computer programs are available_which
may aid those designers and manufacturers who
suffer these restrictions. In addition, the
WSTC plans to perform fatigue tests on SWECS
components under atmospheric loading conditions,
and Rocky Flats personnel are available to
discuss fatigue problems and aid in analysis.
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Figure 15 - View of packing crate damage and
damaged blade skin. (arrow)
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
C.A. Waldon
From:
Q:
G.P. Tennyson
The presentations (not just yours) indicate what the manufacturers did to contri-
bute _o problems and failures. Will there be similar presentations concerning the
DOE/Rockwell contributions?
A: Some of the DOE Rockwell contributions to failures are included in Table I, but
since they were not characteristic of fatigue, they were not discussed (i.e.,
AWT (TIED) rotor failure). This is a good lesson from a big mistake we made and
reported. It will be brought up again and presented in the Reliability and Safety
Program output.
From: W. Frost
Q: a) Are the statistics and causes of failure reported and available to the public?
If so, how does one get a copy?
b) How were the 120 mph (or 94 mph) winds you mentioned measured and where were
they measured relative to the WTG?
A: a) All failures are reported, including the mistakes made during the testing.
All are considered useful lessons and specific requests should be made to
Mr. Darrell Dodge, Rockwell, Int., P.O. Box 464, Golden, CO 80401 - Attn:
Wind Systems Program or call 303/441-1351.
b) The winds were measured by Propvane anemometers located upwind of the SWECS
tower. Anemometer height was 5 ft below rotor centerline and approximately
5 rotor diameters upwind.
From: F.W. Perkins
Q: What do you consider "acceptable" failure behavior for prototypes? Are any fail-
ures acceptable? What RFP initiatives could reduce failures, e.g., extended
contractor testing?
A: Failures are costly, but may be a useful data point if verification of design ulti-
mate strength is desired. Failures outside of "testing" are hurting the entire
industry. Extended testing is part of the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) plan for proto-
type, manufacturer testings.
From: W.C. Walton
Q: Would you agree that the failures you have shown stem from deficient detail struc-
tural design techniques? If so, why do you connect them so strongly with aero-
dynamics?
A: Most of the failures are structural in nature, but it is the difference in theo-
retical to actual which appears to create a failure for an otherwise adequate de-
sign. Analysis should look at nonoperating conditions and be verified for all
conditions.
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